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M E M O R Y  FOR EMOTIONAL 
A N D  NONEMOTIONAL E V E N T S  
I N  DEPRESSION 
A Question of Habit? 
PAULA HERTEL 
T he truest claim that cognitive science can make might also be the least sophisticated: the mind tends to do what it has done before. 
In previous centuries philosophers and psychologists invented constructs such 
as associations, habit strength, and connectivity to formalize the truism, but 
others have known about it, too. In small towns in the Ozarks, for example, 
grandmothers have been overheard doling out warnings such as, "Don't think 
those ugly thoughts; your mind will freeze that way." Depressed persons, like 
most of us, usually don't heed this advice. The thoughts frozen in their minds 
might not be "ugly," but they often reflect disappointments, losses, failures, other 
unhappy events, and a generally negative interpretive stance toward ongoing 
experience. By considering these habits of thinking, we should better understand 
the nature of memory in depressed states. Deliberate attempts to remember are 
either impaired or facilitated in ways that appear related to habits of thinking. 
Even more commonly, memory is expressed indirectly through the content of 
current thoughts and interpretations. 
This chapter examines the relations among habitual thoughts--often called 
ruminations--and memory phenomena in depression. I use "depression" impre- 
cisely, to refer to both diagnostic categories and the self-reported state of dyspho- 
ria. "Dysphoria" is used to denote undiagnosed negative affect, of the sort that 
produces moderate-to-high scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). Although the patterns of perfor- 
mance associated with self-reported measures of depressed mood-such as BDI 
scores-are often similar to those obtained from diagnosed samples, occasional 
evidence for differences should be noted (see Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995). 
We should note the imprecision associated with diagnosis as well (e.g., the 
boundary problems for mood disorders and generalized anxiety disorders; see 
Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001.). On the side of simplicity, how- 
ever, many phenomena appear similar in form, if not extent, across studies mea- 
suring dysphoria and depression. (For a short review, see Wenzlaff, Meier, & 
Salas, 2002.) 
Further caution about the use of "depression" is appropriate when consider- 
ing the many studies performed with experimental mood inductions (e.g., 
through the use of sad or happy music) in an effort to make causal statements 
about mood and memory. In some of these studies, the language of depression 
is used to describe the findings from negatively valenced inductions. (See Parrott 
& Hertel, 2000, for a description ofthese and other methodological issues.) Mood- 
induction studies sometimes reveal patterns similar to those in studies based on 
self-reports or diagnoses. But because habits of ruminating do not likely charac- 
terize students randomly assigned to listen to sad music, this chapter rarely ad- 
dresses findings from mood inductions. 
Habits of Thought 
Negative thinking has been such a prevalent feature of depression, as observed 
clinically, that Beck (1967) used "schema" to capture its habitual and interre- 
lated qualities. These stable cognitive structures were proposed as one way of 
organizing and describing thought patterns in depression. "Rumination" is used 
as a process-oriented companion to the structural construct of a schema. De- 
pressed people tend to ruminate. They ponder the episodes associated with sad 
feelings and imagine similar future occurrences. They focus on their feelings and 
wonder if they will ever change (see Ingram, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Rumination can be an intensely attention-demanding process, yet the initia- 
tion of a ruminative episode is often thoughtless or automatic, even to the ex- 
tent that the person can become so engaged without awareness. The draw 
toward rumination has a lot in common with the tendency to attend to external 
stimuli that are emotionally congruent with depressive concepts. For example, 
dysphoric students are slower to name the color of ink when it spells a word re- 
lated to depression (e.g., Gotlib & McCann, 19 84). On similar tasks nondepressed 
participants preferentially attend to positive members of word pairs and avoid 
the negative members, but clinically depressed and dysphoric participants lack 
this positive bias (McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; McCabe & Toman, 2000). 
Mood-related experience also encourages the tendency to find negative mean- 
ing in ambiguous information, relatively automatically. Lawson, MacLeod, and 
Hammond (2002) devised a clever indirect measure of such interpretive biases 
by measuring the blink reflex to noise occurring as participants imaged situa- 
tions evoked by auditorially presented ambiguous and nonambiguous words. 
Participants who had scored high on the BDI produced particularly amplified 
blink reflexes during the imaging of ambiguous words that lend themselves to 
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negative interpretations, in a pattern similar to that for clearly negative words. 
Using a quite different paradigm, Wenzlaffand Bates (1998) presented strings 
of words that could be unscrambled to form either negative or non-negative sen- 
tences. Dysphoric students formed negative versions more often than others did. 
Even students who were formerly dysphoric displayed this bias under dual-task 
conditions. Although direct reports of beliefs and thoughts tend toward less nega- 
tivity as depression lessens (Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 199 1). findings such as those 
by Wenzlaff and Bates (1998) reveal the enduring nature of depressive habits of 
thought (also see Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz, & Sweatt, 2001). 
Depressive habits of thought seem, moreover, to exacerbate sad moods and 
predict future depressive episodes. In an extensive program of research by Nolen- 
Hoeksema and her colleagues (e.g., Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1998; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), depressed and nondepressed partici- 
pants have been asked to concentrate on either self-focused or distracting 
phrases. The self-focused phrases themselves do not suggest sad or depressed 
mood; in fact, the nondepressed participants typically report feeling no sadder 
after concentrating on them than they feel after entertaining thoughts about 
distracting phrases (e.g., geographical locations). But in study after study, the 
sad moods of depressed participants have increased following the self-focused 
statements and decreased following the distracting phrases. Similarly, Fennell, 
Teasdale, Jones, and Damle (1987) reported improvements in mood after de- 
pressed participants focused on distracting images of outdoor scenes. Therefore. 
habits of thought can affect mood, and recent discoveries have shown that they 
can also predict future mood impairment (e.g., Alloy, Abramson, & Francis. 
1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002). 
Measures of negative-thinking styles, demonstrated either through self-reports 
or by performance on laboratory tasks, predicted episodes of dysphoria and de- 
pression in weeks to come. So, just as depressed mood might establish habits of 
negative thinking, such habits at  least portend, and perhaps help establish, not 
only temporary changes in mood but also future depressive episodes. Indeed, 
substantial empirical evidence now supports the concept of a vicious cycle of 
rumination and mood, described years ago by John Teasdale (1983). 
Habits of Memory 
Separating habits of memory from habits of thinking is a somewhat arbitrary 
exercise. Obviously, ruminative episodes often include autobiographical memo- 
ries that come to mind habitually. Less obviously, perhaps, even the acts of in- 
terpreting current experience in habitually negative ways are themselves 
instances of using memory implicitly or without intention. Jacoby and Kelley 
(1987, citing Polyani, 1958) distinguished the use of memory as a n  object for 
examination from the use of memory as a tool for perception and interpretation, 
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a helpful distinction in the context of considering cognitive habits. Both uses of 
memory--object and tool-can become biased out of habit. 
To refer to memory as an object (explicit memory) is to communicate aware- 
ness that the content of one's thoughts derives from a past event. Episodes from 
one's personal past can come to mind habitually, sometimes uninvited (but with 
full awareness of their temporal status) and sometimes deliberately and repeat- 
edly sought. At the end of this section, I examine the well-documented tendency 
for depressed persons to remember negative episodes from their biographical past. 
Depressed persons habitually remember the bad. 
Habits of remembering negative events also show up in the laboratory. On 
tests of explicit memory, the tendency to think negatively can facilitate the de- 
liberate remembering of experimental materials from the same conceptual neigh- 
borhood. On tests ostensibly unrelated to memory (implicit or indirect tests of 
memory), performance can also reflect habits ofprior preferential processing. The 
experimental goal in both cases is to control the initial experience intended to 
operate as tool or object on the test (i.e., the experience to be "remembered"); 
however, the autobiographical method obviously lacks such control over the 
initial experience. In experimental studies, at least we know the characteristics 
of the immediate experience to be remembered. Yet it is important to keep in mind 
that the power of any mood-congruent effect--experimental or autobiographi- 
cal-no doubt lies in uncontrolled, pre-experimental habits of thought. 
Memory-as-object in the Laboratory 
Ifwe present positively and negatively affective words in a first experimental task 
and later ask the depressed and nondepressed participants to recall those words, 
chances are good that recall will in some way be congruent with mood. (See the 
meta-analysis by Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992.) Maybe the differences will 
be lopsided, especially in the case of dysphoria, with dysphoric participants re- 
calling fewer positive words but the same number of negative words as 
nondysphoric participants do. Likely, the differences will obtain only for words 
encountered conceptually in the first task. In fact, some evidence suggests fur- 
ther restrictions to words considered in relation to the self (e.g.. Bradley & 
Mathews, 1983; Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Dobson & Shaw, 1987). These limita- 
tions support the claim that habits of thought play a role in producing mood- 
congruent recall. 
Habits likely play a large role during the test itself. An illustration is the ex- 
periments performed by Murray, Whitehouse, and Alloy (1999). They found 
evidence of mood-congruent recall following a self-referential task, but only 
when participants were not required to guess in order to produce a criterion 
number of words. When recall was "forced," the mood-related differences van- 
ished. These results should encourage researchers to use a forcing procedure 
more often. A reasonable hypothesis is that mood-congruent biases influence the 
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fluency or ease of remembering, but that materials with other meaning can be 
brought to mind with sufficient persistence or external aid. Such an outcome. 
however, does not reduce our interest in the ubiquitous findings of mood- 
congruent recall and their interpretation. Most acts of recall are probably fluency- 
driven, without prolonged pursuit of additional material. 
Several theoretical frameworks have emphasized the greater degree of con- 
ceptual processing that depressed persons devote to negative materials. Some 
approaches propose that elaborative conceptual processing facilitates recall by 
establishing richer and more diverse retrieval routes (see Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, &Mathews, 1988, and thenetworkaccount by Bower, 1981). Accord- 
ing to the framework of transfer-appropriate processing (Morris, Bransford, & 
Franks, 1977; see Roediger & McDermott, 1992), mood-congruent recall is es- 
tablished by the match between conceptual elaboration during the initial task 
and the conceptual basis of the attempt to remember. This account can be ex- 
tended to include a third type of "occasion": prior habits of thinking. Predated 
by such habits, negative self-referential material comes to mind with greater flu- 
ency, either during the initial episode to be remembered, during the test itself, 
or on both occasions. 
Probably more often than we realize, however, evidence for mood-congru- 
ent recall of conceptually processed material is not obtained. Can a consideration 
of cognitive habits suggest boundary conditions for the mood-congruent effect, 
at least on a post-hoc basis? Among others. Parrott and Spackman (2000) have 
written about the tendency for some people in negative moods to attempt mood 
repair by deliberately thinking positive thoughts. Indeed, evidence for mood- 
incongruent recall might result from these attempts, as reconfirmed recently by 
Rusting and DeHart (2000). They instructed some participants to keep focus- 
ing on negative events (imagined vignettes for specified words or autobiogra- 
phical episodes) used to induce negative mood, much like what one does in 
rumination. Other participants were instructed to engage in positive reapprais- 
als of those events. Subsequent recall was mood-congruent for the former 
participants and mood-incongruent for the latter. These participants were not 
depressed; nevertheless, the results provide a model for what might happen natu- 
rally when depressed persons develop either set of cognitive habits.l 
The literature on depression and mood-congruent recall is substantial. Many 
studies now conducted to examine depression-related biases in other types of 
cognitive tasks often include a demonstration of mood-congruent recall for 
comparison (e.g., Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992). There are 
also published reports of mood-congruent recognition in depression (e.g., 
Wenzlaff et al., 2002), even one that reports mood-related differences in event- 
related potentials during the initial task of rating pleasantness, as well as dur- 
ing the recognition test (Deldin, Keller, Gergen, &Miller, 2001). Different levels 
of brain activity should indeed inform our understanding of mood-congruent 
memory, but they do not necessarily reveal the causal mechanisms underly- 
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ing the dispositions for negative interpretations. Habits might serve as insti- 
gators, outcomes, or both. 
Memory as Tool 
In the last decade of the 20th century, a number of experiments on implicit 
memory in depression were published (e.g., Bazin, Perruchet, De Bonis, & FCline, 
1994; Danion et al., 1991; Denny &Hunt, 1992; Elliott& Greene, 1992; Hertel, 
1994; Hertel& Hardin, 1990; Watkins et al., 1992). Some of these experiments 
were not designed to address mood-congruence. But others varied the emotional 
valence of the materials in attempts to determine whether mood-congruent 
memory would be revealed on indirect tests, in situations in which people 
presumably are not trying to remember. In the same experiments that produced 
mood-congruent recall, there was at first a notable failure to find mood- 
congruent differences on indirect tests. Some researchers anticipated this out- 
come, predicting that prior conceptual processing, so advantageous for strategic 
retrieval tasks, is unimportant for nonstrategic indirect tests (e.g., Williams 
I et al., 1988). If mood-congruent memory relies on differences during initial con- ceptual processing, mood congruence-like other conceptual manipulations, in 
this line of reasoning-should not characterize performance on indirect tests 
(also see Denny & Hunt, 1992). 
An exception to the initial rule was reported by Ruiz-Caballero and Gonzalez 
(1994), who found evidence of mood congruence on a stem-completion task. In 
this indirect test, beginning letters of both previously read words and new words 
are provided, along with instruction to complete the stems with the first words 
that come to mind. Such a test can easily be turned into an explicit test of 
memory-as-object if participants begin to use the stems as cues for deliberate 
recall, even on occasional trials (see Watkins et al., 1992). Responding to these 
concerns about the process purity of the test, Ruiz-Caballero and Gonztilez ma- 
nipulated intention to learn in a second experiment. This manipulation affected 
levels of free recall (which followed stem completion), but not levels of "prim- 
ing" on stem completion, although performance on both tests showed evidence 
of mood congruence, If the participants engaged in deliberate recall on the stem- 
completion test, the authors argued, performance on that test should have shown 
effects of intention to learn. But, as Chapman and Chapman (19 73) alerted us, 
the two memory tests might be differentially sensitive to the manipulation of 
intention to learn, while showing similar differences according to emotional 
valence. The provision of stems might compensate for the lack of intentionality 
in the unintentional condition and thereby overwhelm the effect of intentional 
learning, while nevertheless cuing recall in mood-congruent ways. Therefore, 
doubts about mood-congruent uses of memory as tool remained. 
Evidence for mood-congruent memory from tests of stem completion is sur- 
prising, particularly to a reader in a transfer-appropriate-processing frame of 
mind. Among others, Roediger and McDermott (1992) discussed the impor- 
tance of the match between types of processing at "study" and test. Mood- 
congruent thoughts during initial exposure should facilitate similar thoughts, 
but not perceptions, at the time of testing, regardless ofwhether memory is used 
as tool or object. Word-stem cues should function more perceptually than con- 
ceptually. Therefore, mood-congruent performance on stem completion should 
not occur. In hindsight, it now seems clear that prior habits of reading mood- 
congruent words can sometimes facilitate performance on so-called perceptu- 
ally driven tests (e.g., unprimed word identification, as used by Von Hippel, 
Hawkins, & Narayan. 1994, and stem completion of both old and new items, 
as reported by Bazin et al., 1994). Nevertheless, it was rare to see or to expect 
to see evidence of mood-congruent memory on tests lacking a substantial reli- 
ance on conceptual processing. 
Taking Roediger and McDermott's (1992) suggestion to use conceptual in- 
direct tests, Watkins and his associates (Watkins. Martin. & Stern, 2000; 
Watkins. Vache, Verney, Muller, & Mathews, 1996) have found mixed evidence 
of mood-congruent performance by clinically depressed participants. Watkins 
et al. (1996) found it on a test of free association, but there was no accompany- 
ing assurance against contamination by explicit remembering. Using both per- 
ceptual and conceptual indirect tests, Watkins et al. (2000) found evidence of 
mood congruence following a conceptual orienting task, but only on one con- 
ceptually driven test, the test they called word retrieval (in which one produces 
words when cued by dictionary definitions). Again, we can't be sure that par- 
ticipants were unaware of the memorial nature of the task or that they did not 
attempt to remember deliberately if they were aware. 
Contamination on indirect tests by deliberate remembering should not un- 
dermine interest in the many ways that habits ofthought can influence memory. 
No doubt, all tests that reflect prior experience do so through a mixture of auto- 
matic and recollective processes (see Jacoby. 1991). Even so, it is important to 
know whether instances in which memory is used primarily as a tool for under- 
standing current experience are affected by habits of negative thinking in depres- 
sion, and in this regard more evidence is needed. Obtaining that evidence in the 
laboratory is likely made more difficult by problems in controlling the thoughts 
that should come to mind on indirect tests. Finding conceptual tests that do not 
invite deliberate uses of memory as object and, at the same time, produce effects 
that override other sources of fluency from the past has been difficult. Thinking 
of words from definitions might work because other words cannot be used, but 
tests of free associations may invite too many extra-experimental responses. In 
other words, memory-as-tool is hard to control experimentally. 
A general-purpose or prototypical tool might work better in experimental 
demonstrations of implicit bias. Past habits of thinking influence performance 
on current tasks not only because the exact thought keeps returning (the real- 
world analog for the indirect test of memory as tool) but also because past- 
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related thoughts guide current thoughts. Recent experiments in my lab illustrate 
this point (Hertel, Mathews, Peterson. & Kintner, in press). An initial "training" 
phase was designed to encourage either negative or nonnegative interpretations 
of homographs as participants judged semantic relatedness (e.g., pursue vs. cel- 
ery, in relation to stalk). The subsequent task directed participants to form im- 
ages of individual words, none ofwhich had been used during training and many 
of which were homographs with both negative and nonnegative interpretations; 
performance in this task reflected the bias established during training. The train- 
ing phase in this line of research is intended to model what happens naturally 
when prior habits of thought influence current interpretations in emotionally 
biased ways. The influence itself is an  example of memory, put to use as tool, 
although we tend not to think about it that way. Our typical impressions about 
memorial influences more often occur in conjunction with being reminded about 
our personal past. 
Memory as Autobiographical Experience 
Habits of thought and rumination often include memories of events from the 
personal past. Some of the earliest evidence for mood-congruent memory in de- 
pression was obtained in autobiographical studies (e.g., Clark & Teasdale, 1982). 
with accompanying interpretations that related mood congruence to habits of 
thinking. Now, direct evidence of this linkage is available. Using the same set of 
ruminative or distracting procedures previously used to affect the temporary 
mood of dysphoric students, Lyubomirsky et al. (1998) produced differentially 
negative biases in autobiographical recall. 
In experiment 1, Lyubormirsky et al. (1998) randomly assigned dysphoric 
and nondysphoric students to engage in 8 minutes of rumination or distraction 
and then requested free recall of events from their lives. Following recall, the stu- 
dents rated the hedonic tone of the memories they produced. Dysphoric students 
I who had ruminated prior to recall rated their memories as less positive and more 
1 negative than students in the other three conditions did. The same pattern of 
I 
1 results was obtained in experiment 2, in which the students were prompted to 
recall two happy and two unhappy events, and in experiment 3, in which the 
students judged frequency of occurrence in their lives for 10 positive and 10 
negative events listed by the experimenter. In experiment 4, students were in- 
structed to think aloud during the rumination or distraction phase, and their 
thoughts were recorded. The first six autobiographical memories mentioned in 
the tapes were rated for negativity and unhappiness by independent judges. The 
same pattern of mood congruence occurred: dysphoric students who ruminated 
produced more negative memories, compared to those who were distracted and 
compared to nondysphoric students in both conditions. All experiments also 
produced the pattern of effects on mood ratings described previously in this chap- 
ter: only the dysphoric students felt more or less sad and depressed as a function 
I 
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of rumination or distraction, respectively. In summary, ruminative thoughts not 
only affected mood; they also invoked or contained more negatively toned memo- 
ries from the dysphoric students' personal pasts. 
The experiments by Lyubomirsky et al. (1998) could not address the precise 
nature of the mood-congruent finding. The authors acknowledge difficulties in 
concluding that the effects in the first three experiments pertained to memory 
instead of merely to ratings exaggerated by rumination. And, of course, in any 
autobiographical study, we cannot be sure that the memories are accurate (al- 
though accuracy issues do not trump all other interests in bias). So, with these 
qualifications, it is reasonable to conclude that ruminative habits encourage 
negative thoughts about the past. Especially those students with a reason for 
focusing on negative past events were led to do so by a brief ruminative episode. 
Making a similar point, Rothkopf and Blaney (1991) found clearer evidence of 
mood-congruent autobiographical recall when students filled out the BDI prior 
to the recall test rather than at other times. One interpretation of this type of 
result points to demand established by the statements on the BDI. Another in- 
terpretation, however, posits that a depressed person must become aware of her 
depressed state for the ruminative memories to be invoked. The self-schema must 
be "activated" (Beck, 1967). Caught unaware ofself, he might sidestep habits of 
remembering the negative, and then other characteristics of the situation could 
more powerfully guide performance. 
The notion that a schema or prototype guides attempts to remember is con- 
sistent with a second major characteristic of autobiographical memory in depres- 
sion, that is, its tendency to be overly general, as if attempts to remember events 
from one's life stop short at the categorical level (see the review by Healy & Wil- 
liams, 1999). Williams, Teasdale, Segal, and Soulsby (2000) provide the example 
of the cue word "kindness" eliciting the following memory: "My grandmother 
was always kind to me. She used to take me out when my father got cross" 
(p. 150). The response referred to a category of events instead of to a (requested) 
specific memory. Both positive and negative autobiographical memories tend to 
be described at this categorical level by depressed people (as well as by those who 
suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder; see chapter 4). This tendency might 
reflect an unconscious habit or a conscious strategy to avoid emotion associated 
with specific details (Williams et al., 2000).2 As with so many aspects of depres- 
sive cognition, the direction of cause is not at all clear. An overly categorical 
pattern of thinking and remembering might very well contribute to onset of 
depressive episodes, as suggested by Beck's (1967) theory and by hopelessness 
formulations ofdepression (Abramson, Metalsky, &Alloy, 1989). Whatever the 
origin, the style is not so habitual that it cannot be modified (Williams et al., 
2000). There is even evidence that a focus on specific experience (instead of ab- 
stract analysis) can at least temporarily reduce the categorical extent of auto- 
biographical memory (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Building new habits to recruit 
specific instances can deflect a habitual dark-cloud schema and reveal a differ- 
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ent self to the rememberer. Of course, this assumption has long been incorpo- 
rated into the techniques of cognitive-behavioral therapy. 
Summary 
When past events serve as the objects of current thought, these thoughts are both 
more negative and more abstract for depressed people than for others. Habit's 
role in explicit memory bias is depicted in results from manipulations of self- 
referential processing and rumination. When memory is being used as a tool for 
other purposes, however, convincing evidence of similar bias has not yet been 
established for specific events, even though common sense tells us that these 
unintended effects are ubiquitous. After all, these cognitive habits are nothing 
other than the nondeliberate influences of past conceptual experiences during 
current, similar conceptual acts. Interpretive biases, surely established prima- 
rily by past experience, are well documented in depression. 
A primary question about the influence of cognitive habits on both forms of 
memory concerns the extent to which the influence relies on awareness of one's 
mood state. Tasks that occur prior to tests for mood-congruent recall include self- 
referential judgments of trait words, self-referential images, ruminative train- 
ing, and a variety of mood-related forms and inventories. These tasks are 
guaranteed to make one consider one's mood state. The distracting phrases used 
by Lyubomirsky et al. (1998) might sidestep mood congruence not merely be- 
cause mood is temporarily improved but also because other habits of thinking 
have not been recently exercised. A continuing task for future research is to ask 
whether negative biases can be invoked without awareness of self. 
Interpretive and memory biases are not always symmetrical with mood. De- 
pending on the type of "depression" and on the nature of the materials, the de- 
pressed participants do not always recall more negative words than positive 
words, but they do fail to show the positive bias in the nondepressed group. Some- 
times they recall negative materials at the same level as the nondepressed group 
(but fewer positive words). In part, these asymmetries reflect other differences 
associated with mood and memory-differences in the degree to which con- 
trolled, strategic thoughts are initiated and used. This is the other side of the 
"habit" coin. 
Impaired Control 
in Nonhabitual Tasks 
Deficient cognitive control sets the stage for habits to emerge. At the same time, 
thoughts that habitually occupy attention leave little mental room for thoughts 
about anything else. These assertions of a reciprocal relation between habits of 
thought and controlled attention characterize theoretical approaches to memory 
in depressedstates, particularly when the topic pertains to impaired performance. 
Memory impairment is one of the frequent complaints of people in depressed 
states (Beck, 1967). 
"Control" refers to the operation of cognitive procedures at the opposite end 
of the continuum from habit (see Jacoby, Jennings, & Hay, 1996). Controlled 
procedures are initiated with awareness or intent, and their components are not 
well integrated. From a phenomenological perspective, an individual must de- 
cide what to do or think next-quite a strain in depression. No wonder that efjort 
metaphors have been used so often in descriptions of depressed participants' 
difficulties in tasks that require or reflect control (see Hasher & Zacks, 1979; 
Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, & Gerdt, 1981). 
EfJbrtful Construction 
ofMemory as Object 
The idea that depressed people have trouble carrying out effortful mental proce- 
dures emerged fist in early studies of intellectual functioning. (See the review 
by Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993.) Only after attention theorists 
(e.g., Posner& Snyder, 1975) began to write about the control of attention, how- 
ever, did researchers begin to connect effortful or controlled processing to per- 
formance on memory tests (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & 
Ellis, 1979). In a nutshell, the idea was that the more effortful or attention- 
demanding the process, the more likely that the product would be remembered. 
Like the levels-of-processing framework popular among memory researchers at 
that time (Craik&Lockhart, 1972), the connection of cognitive effort to memory 
was based on assumptions about the strength of memory traces or links in an 
associative network. In the case of eflort, however, strength was thought to di- 
rectly reflect the amount of attention or effort expended during initial process- 
ing, instead of the type or level of processing. Orienting tasks vary in the degree 
of effortful, attention-demanding processes required to complete them; those 
requiring more effort supposedly produce a stronger memory. This idea was not 
unlike the idea of dificulty, but eflort referred to a characteristic of processing. 
not the task itself. Effort-inducing tasks inspired or required more focused con- 
centration, as revealed by longer latencies to perform a simple secondary task 
(e.g.. Tyler et al., 1979). 
The applicability of the effort-memory connection to depression was a cen- 
tral feature of Hasher and Zacks's (1979) often-cited work. Since then, litera- 
ture reviews and a meta-analysis have supported the idea that depression-related 
deficits in memory occur primarily when the initial orientation task requires 
controlled concentration (Burt et al., 1995; Hartlage et al., 1993). Hartlage 
et al. also described the variety of theoretical accounts of effort's role in depres- 
sion-related impairment. Condensed and simplified, one account connects the 
concept of reduced attentional control to abnormal frontal function. (See 
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Davidson. 2000, for a more recent review.) Another claims that effortful pro- 
cessing is limited by the allocation of resources to personal concerns, presum- 
ably for the duration of the depressive episode (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). 
Implicit or explicit in all effort accounts is the assumption that greater effort pro- 
duces a memory trace that is more easily found when needed. This assumption, 
rarely stated quite so simply, is clearly too simple in any form. 
The ability to focus attention and concentrate-either because the neu- 
rotransmitters are fully supplied to the appropriate areas of the brain or because 
other matters are not more compelling-likely has beneficial consequences for 
memory, but only when those particular procedures are subject to replication 
on the test. The intensity of concentration is important to memory only in the 
sense that it must be sufficient to carry out the procedures that will later, when 
replicated, benefit performance on a memory test. According to a transfer- 
appropriate-processing perspective, research should examine that sufficiency, as 
well as the match in attentional focus across the occasions ofinitial exposure and 
memory test. One obvious way to evaluate the transfer-appropriate claim is to 
examine the literature on memory as tool-versus-object in depressed states, be- 
cause both the need for controlled attention and its focus varies across types of 
tests. If depressed people do not focus on aspects that will later guide performance 
on memory tests, and if they do not concentrate sufficiently for later replication, 
performance should suffer, regardless of the "intentionality" of the test or its 
difficulty. 
Appropriate Use of Memory 
as Tool or Object 
Indirect tests of memory are designed to elicit automatic or habitual use of prior 
experience and often do not require concentrated effort during their performance. 
Spelling homophones is an  example of such a test. It takes little concentration 
to spell common words read aloud by the experimenter at a fast pace (e.g., week/ 
weak). Similarly, the orienting tasks prior to the spelling test often require little 
concentration on one of the two alternative meanings (e.g.. while listening to 
the question: Name the days of the week). Simple spelling and comprehension 
use habitual procedures. As expected, the dysphoric students' spelling perfor- 
mance matched that of controls in effects of question-biased meaning; yet in the 
same experiment, the subsequent use of recognition strategies was impaired in 
the dysphoric group (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). 
On the other hand, memory can operate as a tool in performing somewhat 
more attention-demanding tasks. Even stem- and fragment-completion tests, 
when not performed habitually, might function as puzzles that require at  least 
momentary effort and concentration, yet the available reports show no evidence 
of depression-related impairment (in the same experiments that revealed im- 
paired free or cued recall of nonnegative words; e.g., Bazin et al., 1994; Denny 
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& Hunt, 1992; Ruiz-Caballero & Gonzalez, 1994: Watkins et al. 1992).3 Why 
should we not see occasional evidence of impairment? One possible reason is that 
it is sufficient to have focused attention on the look or sound of the words in the 
orienting task in order that memory operates as a tool during perceptual indi- 
rect tests-tests that might well demand concentration on seeing or hearing them 
again. Sustained processing of meaning does not boost performance, but any task 
that discourages attention to words as units might decrease it. For example, con- 
sider an experiment that used a word-identification test, in which previously pre- 
sented and nonpresented words were displayed very briefly and back-masked, and 
the task was merely to try to name the words. Anyone who has tried these tests 
knows that they require focused attention to "see" the words. To what extent 
should identification benefit from prior exposure (memory as tool)? In the orient- 
ing task of one such experiment (Hertel, 1994), I asked participants to evaluate 
some words according to the degree of roundness in their letters. The words evalu- 
ated in this task were identified more frequently on the subsequent perceptual test 
than were words not previously exposed, but this effect was smaller for the de- 
pressed participants! A reasonable postdiction is that during the orienting task the 
depressed participants attended less often to the words as integrated units and so 
were disadvantaged in naming them on the test. Word identification benefits from 
prior lexical processing, even as it requires concentration or effort. 
Conceptual processing facilitates use of the same concepts later on. Concep- 
tual implicit tests require prior attention to meaning and therefore should reflect 
the extent to which meaning has been fully attended. For example, Jenkins and 
McDowall(2001) found a depression-related impairment on both free recall and 
the indirect test of category association, but only for the words that had been 
generated from antonyms (vs. merely read) during the orienting phase. No clear 
evidence of impaired fragment completion was found for either the previously 
generated or previously read words. These results are not as unambiguous as I 
describe them; for example, baseline performance on the category-association 
test was low for the depressed group. Nevertheless, the pattern illustrates the 
importance of transfer-appropriate conceptual processing. And the results also 
suggest that the depressed participants' conceptual processing during antonym- 
generation was insufficient to support the later production of those concepts 
during recall or category association. Whether category association functioned 
purely as a test of memory as a tool cannot be assured, of course. Like the free- 
association task used by Watkins et al. (1 996), it might have been contaminated 
by attempts to remember, particularly in the nondepressed group. Because other 
category associates are available, the depressed participants could perform the 
test without concentrating on the past and, therefore, without showing the ben- 
efit of prior generation of category members, and a mood-related impairment 
would thereby result. 
Depressed people are less likely to devote effort to thinking about the past when 
the current task can be performed without doing so. This claim receives indirect 
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support from a series of problem-solving experiments in which memory for simi- 
lar past problems operated as tool or object in facilitating solutions for current 
problems (Hertel& Knoedler, 1996). The logic-based word problems were them- 
selves attention-demanding and quite difficult without prior experience in learn- 
ing how to solve similar problems. During training, problems were presented for 
solution attempts, and each (almost always unsuccessful) attempt was followed 
by experimenter-provided instruction in how to solve that problem. Following 
the training phase, a series of structurally identical but superficially dissimilar 
target problems was presented, always without such instruction. Because we 
were curious about how memory operates as a tool in problem solving, we in- 
cluded a condition to measure spontaneous transfer; in this condition, the train- 
ing problems were not mentioned during the target series. We also included a 
condition in which we provided very specific cues and instructions for using 
memory for the structurally similar training problem "as object" just prior to 
presenting each target. In two experiments, these hints for recalling the prior 
analogy actually disrupted performance by the nondysphoric students. Focus- 
ing attention on the details of the past problem while solving a new one seemed 
to be a transfer-inappropriate use of prior experience; in comparison, more tar- 
gets were solved when memory for the analogy was allowed to operate as a tool. 
The dysphoric students performed similarly well, with or without hints to think 
back, which led us to suspect that they did not sustain attention to the relevant 
past problem and therefore were not led astray in transfer-inappropriate ways. 
Attending to important features of the target problem itself benefited from ear- 
lier attention to those features of the analog. 
In predicting performance in the problem-solving experiments, Knoedler and 
I initially reasoned that if the nondepressed students' solution rates were simi- 
lar with and without hints, they might have been using memory as object on 
their own initiative in the no-hint condition. If this pattern were obtained, we 
expected to find depressive impairments. When the hints turned out to be detri- 
mental for nondepressed students, we inferred that memory for training prob- 
lems in theno-hint condition operated spontaneously as a tool. In reasoning this 
way, we did not truly believe that either use was "all or none." Similarly. most 
researchers understand that memory usually operates as both tool and object 
in a variety of memory tasks and that memory tasks are not "process-pure" 
(Jacoby, 1991). Yet when no attempt is made to determine the degree to which 
one use of memory contaminates the other use, reasoning about the role of con- 
trolled attention in depressive memory is made more difficult. Luckily, Jacoby's 
process-dissociation procedure directly addressed the problem of how to exam- 
ine the separate influences of tool and object memory. 
The central method used by Jacoby-and others, subsequently-entails two 
conditions of instructions: one in which automatic or habitual uses of memory 
operate in concert with controlled attention to the past and one in which they 
operate in opposition toeach other in producing a response. In recognition tasks, 
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for example, participants are instructed to endorse items that either feel famil- 
iar or are recollected from a specific prior task on inclusion trials, whereas on 
exclusion trials. they are instructed to reject items from that specific task while 
endorsing other old items. In the inclusion case, recognition hits are produced 
by both controlled memory for specific prior occurrences and habitual procedures 
of reading or thinking words that were earlier read or thought. The uses of 
memory operate in concert. In the exclusion case, however, items from the spe- 
cific prior task are (erroneously) endorsed only if they produce a feeling of famil- 
iarity in the absence of memory for source as object. Habit and control operate 
in opposition to each other. When independence of the two classes of influences 
can be assumed, their estimates can be computed from the proportion of posi- 
tive recognition responses under the two instructional conditions. The relevance 
of these procedures to depression-related impairment should be obvious: Unless 
habits are disrupted during orientation, habitual use of memory as tool should 
remain intact, and only the estimates of controlled uses of memory as object 
should reveal the impairment. This indeed is what we found on recognition tests 
following a conceptual orienting task (Hertel & Milan, 1994). The dissociation 
was replicated through similar procedures designed for conceptually cued frag- 
ment-completion tests (e.g., building-s-o-e) following the reading of meaning- 
ful cue-target pairs in the orienting task (e.g., building-stone), (Hertel, 1998; also 
see Hertel & Meiser, 2000, for a multinomial model applied to those results). 
Again, the importance of transfer-appropriate attention across orienting task and 
test is illustrated. To the extent that participants attended to the connection 
between the cue and target initially, they would be able to attend to it as an object 
in the past, including the target or excluding it when required by instruction. A 
less careful focus on the pair initially would make it harder to both exclude and 
include deliberately on the test. The component of memory that represents the 
past as the object of attention is the one that shows a deficit associated with de- 
pression. However, the mere reading of the word pair during the orienting task 
makes the target available later, as a completion of the fragment, in the pres- 
ence or absence of controlled recollection, and this habit-oriented component 
of memory was unimpaired. Thus, attentional control is indeed a factor in pro- 
ducing memory impairment in depression, when performance relies on the rep- 
lication of focus across the two  occasion^.^ 
Habit as Detriment to Control 
Poor performance often reflects absence of habit in performing a cognitive act. 
This is why controlled attention is required-to do the nonhabitual and think 
about things one does not usually think about. Seemingly, all of the reported 
cases of depression-related impairment involved nonnegative materials-mate- 
rials unrelated to the personal concerns thought to occupy attention habitually 
in depression. Habits of negative thinking benefit the controlled use of memory 
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for related stimuli, as is the case on tests of mood-congruent recall, but other- 
wise they can detract. Therefore, attentional control in depression should depend 
on the suppression of habitual thoughts in the service of focusing elsewhere. A 
line of research begun by Hasher and Zacks (1988) has shown evidence of inhi- 
bition difficulties associated with aging that might also characterize depression. 
Like effort-related difficulties, inhibitory difficulties in depression could logically 
arise from fundamental frontal dysfunction, from specific concerns associated 
with the depressed state, or from both (see Hertel, 199 7). 
Reliance on an inhibition construct is not the only way to represent the prob- 
lem of impaired control in the context of habitual thinking. We might slightly 
shift perspective to propose that control is made more difficult when other hab- 
its are strong. Habits of attending (e.g., to negatively toned events) might make 
the act of disengaging attention more difficult than it otherwise might be in the 
course of turning attention to a different event. At this stage of research, how- 
ever, the aptness of the metaphor (inhibition vs. disengagement) is less impor- 
tant than gathering evidence for depression-related difficulties in turning away 
from habit-related stimuli in order to do something else. 
The "something else" in experimental studies has often been the task to re- 
spond to a dot or color patch in a screen location that differs from the one occu- 
pied by a mood-relevant word (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997: McCabe & 
Gotlib, 1995). Bradley et al. found dysphoria-related biases under conditions of 
suprathreshold but not subthreshold exposures to the words. They argued that 
the problem was therefore one of disengaging attention, because a bias in allo- 
cating attention to relevant stimuli would pertain for both exposure conditions. 
Recently, investigators have used the negative-priming paradigm to exam- 
ine depression-related difficulties in disengagement or inhibition. In the standard 
version of this paradigm, items to be attended and ignored are presented con- 
currently on each trial, with the attended item on trial X sometimes having 
served as the ignored item on trial X-1. When the ignored is subsequently at- 
tended, or even when the same category of the ignored is now the category of 
the attended, the judgment for trial X is slowed, compared to control conditions. 
This slowing (called negative priming) is attributed sometimes to inhibition of 
the ignored item or category and sometimes to transfer-inappropriate attention 
(Neil1 & Mathis, 1998). If depressed people have trouble disengaging from mood- 
related thoughts, negative-priming effects should be reduced or absent. Some 
suggestion of this difficulty has been demonstrated in a simple letter-identification 
task after students were induced by music to feel sad (von Hecker, Conway, 
Meiser, & Holm, 2002). However, Joormann (in press) has used a more concep- 
tually relevant task. She asked nondysphoric and mildly dysphoric students to 
judge the self-relevance of negative and positive targets while ignoring distractors 
of the same or opposite valence. All participants took longer to judge the self- 
relevance of positive words when positive words had been ignored on the previ- 
ous trial, compared to previous trials of ignored negative words. This finding 
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roughly corresponds to the typical negative-priming effect. The same pattern of 
negative priming was obtained for nondysphoric participants in judging nega- 
tive items after having ignored negative (vs. positive) items, but it was not per- 
tain obtained for mildly dysphoric participants or for those who reported prior 
episodes of depressed mood. The difference in these patterns suggests that the 
participants who tended currently to be in more negative mood states (or reported 
feeling depressed in the past) ignored the negative adjectives less successfully.5 
Difficulty in disengaging attention from negative material is more clearly 
documented in connection with anxiety disorders or high levels of trait anxiety 
(see Fox, Russo, Bowles. & Dutton, 2001). Again, when researchers use scores 
on inventories like the BDI or even when they use diagnostic labels to form groups 
for experimental purposes, their dysphoric or depressed participants are likely 
to be anxious. In the other direction, ruminative habits more typically attributed 
to depression also typify anxious states or traits (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Re- 
gardless of their lack of specificity to depression, however, habits of dwelling on 
the negative have consequences for memory beyond those reported in relation 
to evidence for mood-congruent memory. and these consequences are not always 
desirable. 
One consequence might be trouble in forgetting. Not only do depressed people 
have trouble ignoring mood-congruent material when they focus on other ma- 
terial presented concomitantly (as in Joormann's negative-priming studies), they 
also less successfully suppress mood-congruent material in more sustained at- 
tempts. Evidence for difficulties in sustained thought suppression has been docu- 
mented by Wegner, Wenzlaff, and their colleagues (for review, see Wenzlaff & 
Bates, 1998). Thought suppression, whether accomplished directly or indirectly 
in the service of thinking about something else, plays an important role in for- 
getting (see Anderson & Neely, 199 6). And forgetting can be a valuable outcome, 
particularly for the depressed person who might prefer not to ruminate about 
past events beyond one's control. 
Intentional forgetting has been studied in the lab by directing participants to 
forget items or lists of it ern^.^ Clearly, instructions to forget lists can have their 
intended effect, particularly when the participants are given something else to 
think about. To document effects of direct suppression on individual items, 
Anderson and Green (2001) developed the "thinklno-think" procedure. After 
learning pairs of unrelated words to a fixed criterion, the participants were given 
a varied number of trials (0, 1, 8, or 16)  to practice the retrieval of the second 
member of some pairs and to practice the suppression of the second member of 
other pairs. The first member of each pair was presented as a cue for either re- 
trieval or suppression. This practice phase was followed by a final test of cued 
recall, in which participants were instructed to recall all of the response words, 
regardless of previous instruction. In several experiments, the main finding was 
increased forgetting as a function of practice in suppression, both when the origi- 
nal studied cues were used at test and when new cues related categorically to 
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the response words were used at test. The simple story is that people can suc- 
cessfully suppress to the point of incurring forgetting. Can depressed people do 
this as well as others? Melissa Gerstle and I have recently conducted an experi- 
ment to answer that question (Hertel & Gerstle, in press). 
To investigate the possibility of mood-congruent suppression, we replicated 
the procedures developed by Anderson and Green (2001), but with one major 
change: The cues we used throughout the experiment were adjectives related to 
the target nouns. On half of the pairs, the adjectives gave the essentially neutral 
nouns a negative meaning, and on the other half, the meaning was positive. (The 
materials were fully counterbalanced, e.g., gloomy cottage vs, splendid cottage.) 
To encourage initial attention to the emotional valence of the materials, in the 
learning task we instructed participants to construct a self-referential image for 
each pair and to rate the meaningfulness of the image. These materials and in- 
structions had been used earlier in a recall experiment without suppression in- 
structions, together with other materials in which a third set of adjectives 
produced neutral concepts when paired with the same nouns (e.g., plain cottage; 
Hertel& Parks, 2002). In that experiment, dysphoric and nondysphoric partici- 
pants alike recalled the nouns when they had been given emotional meanings 
(both positive and negative) more often than when they had been given neutral 
meanings. In the suppression experiment, Gerstle and I also found that recall was 
not significantly associated with emotional valence for the dysphoric participants 
(although the controls showed more forgetting of nouns from positive pairs). 
More important, however, was our finding that the effect of practicing sup- 
pression on later recall was significantly reduced in the dysphoric group. The 
dysphoric participants recalled as many of the rehearsed items as did the non- 
depressed participant and significantly more of the targets that they had prac- 
ticed suppressing, regardless of the cues' valence (see fig. 6.1). 
Similarly, Power, Dalgleish, Claudio, Tata, and Kentish (2000) found evi- 
dence for depression-related difficulties in one of their three experiments on di- 
rected forgetting. Perhaps because their participants were clinically depressed 
(experiment 3), however, this difference was restricted to negative adjectives. 
Recall of positive adjectives-to be remembered or to be forgotten-was no bet- 
ter or worse than that of anxious participants and controls. 
1 
At the same time that depressed people might have trouble deliberately for- 
getting self-referential thoughts, they also have trouble remembering what they 
I 
had been thinking about prior to an episode of self-referential rumination. At 
least this is true for the controlled component of memory, as estimated through 
process-dissociation procedures on a test of cued fragment completion (Hertel, 
1998). In the experiment previously mentioned, we inserted what might be seen 
as an interference phase between the initial orienting task of reading word pairs 
and the final memory phase. We assigned a third of the dysphoric and control 
participants to merely sit and wait for 7 minutes, another third to ruminate, and 
the final third to think about other matters, such as geographical locations. The 
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70 
Baseline Practice 
Intervening Task 
Figure 6.1. The mean percentage of targets recalled on the final test, after depressed 
and nondepressed participants had practiced retrieving or suppressing them in re- 
sponse to cues. (Adapted from "Depressive Deficits in Forgetting," by P. T. Hertel 
and M. Gerstle, in press, Psychological Science. Copyright O 2003 by the American 
Psychological Society.) 
latter two groups actually underwent the rumination or distraction procedures 
used by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1 99 3) that I described elsewhere in this 
chapter. Following the period of self-focus in the rumination condition, the dys- 
phoric participants showed impaired control on the memory test (relative to the 
other participants), much like those who simply waited during the 7-minute 
interval. However, the participants who thought about objects and locations 
showed no depression-related impairment in control (see fig. 6.2). In addition 
to improving mood under some conditions (e.g., Lyubormirsky et al., 1998), dis- 
traction also seems to improve controlled attention to the past when the 
rememberer is depressed. And because the distracted group showed no impair- 
ment, it is tempting to infer that even those who merely waited for 7 minutes 
focused on sufficiently compelling matters that thinking back during the memory 
test was made more difficult. 
Inherent in those results (Hertel, 1998) are the final two points of this chap- 
ter: situations that permit mind wandering invite habitual thinking and im- 
pair memory for other matters. Deficient performance is not, therefore, an 
inevitable outcome of depression, because habits can be opposed in ways that 
benefit control. 
Dysphoric 
Wait Ruminate Distract 
Intervening Task 
Figure 6.2. The mean estimate of controlled retrieval by dysphoric and nondys- 
phoric participants, following an intervening period of waiting for 7 minutes, en- 
tertaining ruminative thoughts, or entertaining distracting thoughts. Adapted 
from "The Relationship between Rumination and Impaired Memory in Dyspho- 
ric Moods." by P. T. Hertel, 1998, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, p. 170. 
Copyright O 1998 by the American Psychological Association. 
Opposing Habit Through Control 
Here is the prototype of the depressed rememberer as constructed by the find- 
ings described thus far: she (well, yes, she) is someone who habitually ruminates 
about personal concerns and other negative events and whose interpretations 
and perceptions reflect those habits; someone who tends to remember negatively 
affective events more often or remembers events as more negatively toned; and 
someone whose memory for neutral or positive events is occasionally impaired, 
at least when attention is allowed to stray to habitual patterns. This person seems 
to have little cognitive self-control. (One can almost hear her grandmother's 
admonishments.) 
I use "self-control" to imply that the most important aspect of impaired con- 
trol in depression is control initiated by the self. Controlled attention to any stimu- 
lus can be facilitated by the environment; the structure of the task, stimulus 
salience, and its interest value are some of the relevant dimensions. Cognitive 
self-control is merely a convenient term for referring to the focusing, switching, 
and sustaining of attention under conditions where stimulus and task dimen- 
sions do not play obvious roles. In structural terms, self-control is loosely analo- 
gous to the central executive component of working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974). Its physical components are frontal functions; indeed, much of the evi- 
dence for depression-related differences in brain activity implicates activity in the 
prefrontal cortex (see Davidson, 2000; Heller & Nitschke, 1998). Similar 
behavioral evidence is supplied by Channon (1 996), who found impairments on 
a neuropsychological test of frontal function-the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST)--even in a sample of dysphoric college students. Furthermore, by sta- 
tistically controlling for correlations with BDI scores, Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(2000) found WCST differences associated with the tendency to ruminate. Self- 
reported ruminators made more perseverative errors on the WCST and failed to 
maintain set more often than did nonruminators. In a basic sense, then, cogni- 
tive self-control is a problem in depression, as well as a problem for people who 
tend to ruminate. 
A good simple example of the memory problems associated with depressive 
deficits in self-control or initiation is impaired prospective memory in the absence 
of reminding cues (Rude, Hertel, Jarrold, Covich, & Hedlund, 1999). Depressed 
and control participants were instructed at the start of the session to press a func- 
tion key every 5 minutes during their performance of an ongoing test of general 
knowledge. The depressed participants checked the time less often and thereby 
made more errors on the prospective task. 
Reduced self-control affects performance in memory experiments under con- 
ditions of poor external control. For example, dysphoric students' performance 
yielded lowerestimates of controlled recollection in my cued-fragment-comple- 
tion study (1998) after a period of lax external control. Doing nothing for 7 min- 
utes presented ample opportunity for mind wandering, because the dysphoric 
students had more trouble subsequently turning attention to the task of remem- 
bering. Although this depression-related impairment in controlled recollection 
was closely mimicked by data from participants in the rumination condition, it 
is not certain that the "waiting" students also ruminated during that period. For 
some, the break from the ongoing experiment might have invited mind blank- 
ing. As a leaned response to stress, the habit to "tune out" might be just as reflec- 
tive of poor self-control as the habit to ruminate. Watts, MacLeod, and Morris 
(1988) found that blanking tended to occur in tasks that involve planning (tap- 
ping frontal functions). Although we know too little about blanking in compari- 
son to mind wandering or rumination, either type of habit should take over 
during periods of lax external control of the procedures to be performed. 
As I have argued previously (199 7,2000), lax external control often typifies 
real-world thinking, and it sometimes characterizes the trials that constitute the 
orienting task in laboratory experiments. The orienting task is, according to effort 
metaphors and other processing frameworks, the critical period in determining 
whether the material will be recalled later. Therefore, in allowing sufficient time 
on each trial for the elaborative processing that benefits recall, memory research- 
ers also encourage habits of mind wandering or blanking. Years ago. Stephanie 
Rude and I used a simple manipulation of either allowing an orienting decision 
to be made at any time during an 8-second exposure or requiring the decision at 
the end of the trial, along with a repetition of the target word. (The decision con- 
cerned whether a target word fit sensibly into a sentence frame.) We called the 
two conditions unfocused and jocused, respectively (Hertel & Rude, 199 la) .  Inthe 
focused condition, the materials did not stay on the screen for the 8-second pe- 
riod, as they did in the unfocused condition. To perform each trial in the focused 
condition, the participants had to hold the word and decision in mind for the 
duration of the trial, but their minds could wander in the unfocused condition 
because decisions could be reported early on during the 8 seconds. On the sub- 
sequent test of free recall, depressed participants from the unfocused condition 
performed poorly, compared to their nondepressed counterparts. This deficit, 
however, was eliminated for participants who had been required to focus dur- 
ing the orienting task. 
The depressed participants' ability to perform the task could not ever have been 
at issue. The task was not difficult in either condition (even though it had been 
used previously as an example of an effortful orienting task by Tyler et al., 1979, 
and Ellis, Thomas, &Rodriguez, 1984). Indeed, the more difficult condition clearly 
was the focused one, because it required sustained attention. Therefore, instead 
of making the task easier to accomplish, the focusing instruction structured the 
task transfer-appropriately. Participants were required to attend to the recent past 
(a few seconds earlier) in the same way that they were later required to attend to 
the past during the recall test. Moreover, external control compensated for poor 
self-control by not allowing habits of thought (or no-thought) to carry the day. 
There were a number of variations of this attention-focusing procedure (Hertel 
& Rude, 199 lb).  We also tried to stiffen the requirements at  the time of the test 
by using a forced-recall procedure. Although "forcing" the participants to write 
a certain number of words on the recall test merely increased levels of recall for 
everyone in our experiments, others have found that this procedure eliminated 
the depression-related deficit (e.g., Murray et al., 1999). The forcing procedure 
counteracts a possibly conservative response tendency, but it does so by asking 
the participant to refocus attention on the past events, which might be at least 
as important as overcoming hesitancy or conservatism. 
Other methods of improving performance by providing external support have 
not always been successful. For example, in the recognition experiment with 
process-dissociation procedures, Milan and I reinstated the original context word 
in some test conditions. That procedure boosted estimates of controlled recollec- 
tion for both dysphoric and nondysphoric participants (Hereel& Milan, 1994). 
Clearly, the nondysphoric students had done something that we had failed to 
capture by the manipulation. This was also true when recognition was much 
more strategically dependent (Hertel& Hardin, 1990). Hardin and I noticed that 
the nondysphoric students seemed to be using their performance on the prior 
indirect test of homophone-spelling to decide whether the recognition item had 
occurred in the original set of questions (e.g., WeekIWeak? Did I just spell that 
word? How did I spell it? And was that word in a question? Oh, name the days of 
the week? Yes.). In a subsequent experiment, we asked participants to answer a 
similar set of questions before making each recognition judgment. By doing so, 
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we found a pattern of dependency in.the dysphoric group that mimicked the 
pattern of nondysphoric judgments under unassisted conditions, but the 
nondysphoric participants who got the set of question cues outwitted us. Their 
performance improved even for those items that they had spelled in the opposite 
way (e.g., WeekIWeak? Did I just spell that word? Weak? Is there another way 
to spell it?). These and similar differences illustrate the difficulty in predicting 
exactly what people do under conditions of lax external control, but the findings 
also show that performance in depressed states can be improved by at least some 
version of external support. And the main point is that this support works be- 
cause it forestalls the emergence of cognitive habits in depression-habits that 
interfere under poorly controlled conditions and make it difficult for the depressed 
person to take control and show cognitive initiative (see Hertel, 2000). 
Habits of thought are difficult to oppose. The historically important construct 
of habit strength in Hull's theory of learning (1943) was opposed by the construct 
of inhibition, but Hull's rats experienced immediate consequences-missing 
reward-that led to the orderly development of inhibitory strength. The conse- 
quences of thought are often much farther removed, so suppressing a turn of the 
mind is perhaps much harder to learn than is suppressing a turn in the maze. 
Modern approaches to thought suppression acknowledge this dEculty. Wegner's 
ironic-processes theory (1994). for example, includes a construct called a moni- 
tor that checks whether thoughts are being successfully suppressed. According to 
this point of view, the depressed person's need to suppress self-concerns, particu- 
larly during tasks that require self-control and initiative, presumably "activates" 
the monitor and ironically brings those concerns back to mind. At the very least, 
any attention devoted to the task of suppression likely disrupts procedures that 
require sustained attention or planning. Instructions to suppress are therefore 
much harder to follow when not accompanied by a task that directs attention 
through external means. 
The short version of that argument is that simple self-controlled thought 
suppression likely does not work well for depressed people, both in the sense of 
potentiating later forgetting (Hertel & Gerstle, in press) or freeing attention to 
focus in ways that later benefit remembering. In the latter case, what works best 
is environmental support, but the world is not often arranged to be helpful. What 
also seems to work in the sense ofimproving both memory and momentary mood 
is a good distraction procedure (e.g., Hertel, 1998; Lyubormirsky et al., 1998). 
Distraction at least interrupts ongoing habitual thoughts so that the depressed 
person begins the recall task on even footing. There is even some reason to won- 
der if reappraisals of intrusive thoughts, under some circumstances, might aid 
recall of nonnegative events through temporary mood improvement or altered 
perspective (in the manner found by Rusting & DeHart. 2000; also see Parrott & 
Spackrnan, 2000). However, are these measures enough? 
According to Teasdale et al. (2000) and others, approximately 80% of people 
diagnosed with major depressive disorder experience recurrent depressive epi- 
208 MEMORY A N D  E M O T I O N  
sodes. Practical considerations therefore encourage us to consider not merely the 
opposition of habitual thinking by controlled procedures but the training of new 
habits through practice in control. Virtually the only line of research with that 
general aim is the research on mindfulness training, adapted from the medita- 
tion work of Kabat-Zinn by Teasdale, Williams, and Segal. The training consists 
of a sustained focus on some simple act (typically breathing). When attention 
wanders, the individual acknowledges the new thought or feeling but then re- 
directs attention to the simple act. It differs from simple thought suppression in 
two main respects: acknowledgment of the thought and practice in redirection. 
Do the benefits of such training extend to long-term habits of control? So far, 
Williams et al. (2000) have found that mindfulness training boosts the effects 
of cognitive-behavioral therapy in reducing overly general autobiographical 
memory by formerly depressed participants. Moreover, for people with at 
least three prior episodes of depression, the addition of mindfulness training to 
cognitive-behavioral therapy significantly reduced recurrence during the subse- 
quent year (Teasdale et al., 2000). These studies, ofcourse, are merely a beginning. 
In short, the best antidote to maladaptive habits is a new set of habits-not 
the opposite sort of habits recommended by Pollyanna and the teachings of 
Norman Vincent Peale (1 9 56) and not the habits of suppression as recommended 
by certain grandmothers but the habits of thought control. Cognitive control. 
as conceived by cognitive psychologists, is a concept that opposes habit, in that 
habitual procedures require little attention. But if the necessary control proce- 
dures-awareness of the wandering stream of thought and subsequent disen- 
gagement, for example-are practiced "religiously," they too can become 
habitual. In the absence of mind wandering and rumination, memory biases are 
less extreme, and memory impairment is repaired. 
Notes 
1. Induction procedures are particularly useful when it is difficult to determine 
the content of natural thought, although some procedures do not produce memo- 
rial effects that mimic patterns in natural depression. For a case in which they fail 
to show mood-congruent recall in the same study in which it was obtained for dys- 
phoric students, see Kwiatkowski and Parkinson (1994; also see Eich & McCaulay. 
2000; Perrig & Perrig, 1988). 
Inductions have also been used to study mood-dependent memory: better 
memory when mood at initial encounter matches mood at test. Mood-dependent 
memory has also been studied with participants diagnosed with bipolar disorder. 
When the "mood" during initial encounter (mania or depression) matched the 
mood at test, higher levels of recall or recognition were found (Eich, Macaulay, & 
Lam, 1997; Weingartner, Miller, & Murphy, 1977). See Blaney (1986, p. 237) 
for a discussion of how mood-dependent memory can be seen as a special case of 
mood-congruent memory. 
2. Ironically, overgeneral tendencies have also been correlated with spontaneous 
intrusions of stressful memories (Brewin. Reynolds, & Tata, 1999; Wessel. Merckel- 
bach, & Dekkers, 2002). 
3. In one exception to the early rule, Elliott and Greene (1992) did show impaired 
word-stem completion and homophone spelling but omitted unprimed items on the 
test, which might have encouraged participants' awareness of the memorial goal 
and a concomitant use of memory as object. (See Bazin et al., 1994, and Roediger & 
McDermott, 1992. for full discussions of their design.) 
4. Of course, attention might well be impaired during initial exposure. Consider 
a report by Rokke. Arnell. Koch, and Andrews (2002). who investigated the size of 
attentional blinks in a rapid-serial-visual-presentation paradigm (RSVP) adminis- 
tered to students with varying degrees of dysphoria. Moderately to severely dysphoric 
participants performed relatively well when the only task was to detect the presence 
of a single letter in the stream of rapidly presented letters. However, their perfor- 
mance suffered more, compared to that of nondysphoric or mildly dysphoric par- 
ticipants, when the task also involved attention to a letter occurring earlier in the 
stream (a deeper attentional blink). This outcome implicates fundamental deficits 
in redirecting attention. 
5. Some of the results reported in this section should be viewed cautiously, given 
either unexpected differences on baseline trials (e.g., Joormann. in press) or lack of 
information about baseline (e.g.. Bradley et al.. 1997). 
6. Studies using this directed forgetting paradigm have revealed interesting 
differences associated with clinical disorders. For example, Sonntag et al. (2003) 
have shown that schizophrenics fail to show effects of directed forgetting on mea- 
sures of recollection (see chapter 7). McNally. Metzger, Lasko, Clancy, and Pitman 
(1998) found poor directed forgetting of trauma words by women with posttrau- 
matic stress disorder, as well as deficits in remembering neutral and positive words 
on the lists to be remembered (see chapter 4). 
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